We estimate a preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately-insured birth episodes in California. The function varies across insurers and is additively separable in: a hospital price paid by the insurer, the distance traveled, and plan and severity-speci…c hospital …xed e¤ects (capturing various dimensions of hospital quality). We use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital-severity interactions and obtain markedly di¤erent results than those from a logit. The inequality estimator indicates that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to hospital prices. Capitated plans are willing to send patients further to utilize similar-quality lower-priced hospitals; but the trade-o¤ between quality and costs does not vary with capitation rates.
Introduction
We estimate an insurer-speci…c preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privatelyinsured women giving birth in California. We assume that function is additively separable in: a price paid by the insurer to the hospital, the distance between a patient's home and her hospital, and plan and severity-speci…c hospital …xed e¤ects which capture various dimensions of hospital quality. The prior hospital choice literature used standard discrete choice analysis and typically assumed that, since the choice of hospital was made jointly by the patient and the physician neither of whom were directly responsible for payment, price paid by the insurer did not a¤ect referrals.
The insurers do, however, di¤erentially provide cost based incentives to the physician groups they contract with through capitation arrangements. We provide an analysis of referrals which allows for detailed severity-speci…c hospital interactions and errors in the measure of price. The results indicate that the price paid by insurers to hospitals does impact referrals, and that the price response is larger for insurers whose physician groups are more highly capitated. These insurers are willing to send patients further to utilize similar-quality lower-priced hospitals, but are not willing to sacri…ce quality to lower cost.
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Interestingly the contracts we observe in California have similar features to those imposed on Accountable Care Organizations by the Patient Protection and A¤ordable Care act of 2010.
Accountable Care Organizations are groups of providers that are eligible to share in any cost savings they achieve for the Medicare program. Similar sharing arrangements are expected (and are already starting) to be adopted by private insurers. The incentives for ACOs and for the California insurers in our data are similar in that the provider group either bears the …nancial risk for hospital payments or bene…ts from hospital savings relative to a benchmark. Also in both cases the incentives are based on the costs incurred by the group (rather than by individual physicians), with no formal guidance on how these incentives are passed down to individual physicians or patients.
The extent to which providers respond to hospital prices both a¤ects costs (and hospital costs make up more than 30% of national health care spending) and has implications for the way we analyze numerous policy issues. In particular any analysis of the e¤ect of hospital mergers on hospital prices will require an assumption regarding the e¤ect of price increases on referrals. Assuming away this e¤ect will likely result in an over-estimate of the price increases that will result from a merger.
Similarly a merger analysis that does not take into account price e¤ects will likely over-estimate the merged entity's incentives to invest in new high-cost technologies and under-estimate its incentives to invest in cost-reducing technologies.
The process by which a patient chooses a hospital involves multiple players. Decisions are made by referring physicians in consultation with their patients. HMOs and other insurers often attempt to in ‡uence physicians' choices through direct …nancial incentives. In California these include two types of capitation arrangements: professional services capitation contracts under which large referring physician groups bear …nancial risk for services they provide and global capitation contracts where they also bear risk for hospital services their patients receive from other providers.
In 2003 73% of payments made to primary physicians by the six largest carriers in our data were capitation payments; the proportions varied substantially across carriers from 97% for Paci…care to 38% for Blue Cross (more detail on the data underlying these numbers is given below). Physician groups often pass the …nancial incentives directly to their member physicians; they may also make physicians' promotion on the pay scale contingent (formally or informally) on their management of costs. However if higher quality hospitals negotiate higher prices, both insurers and physicians face a trade-o¤ between incentives to reduce costs and other issues patients care about, like health outcomes and convenience factors. Moreover the extent to which patients and/or doctors, and hence ultimately the insurer, care about these factors is likely to vary with the severity of illness.
We use hospital discharge data for privately insured managed care enrollees from California in 2003 and focus on a single diagnosis: the labor/birth episode for pregnant women. Unfortunately our dataset does not identify the physician referring each patient to her hospital; we therefore cannot directly observe physician behavior. We ask whether the observed referrals for patients whose insurers have di¤erent capitation rates indicate di¤erent trade-o¤s between price, quality and patient convenience factors.
The analysis builds on the previous literature on hospital demand. Previous papers consider the factors a¤ecting patients'hospital choices in some detail but almost exclusively make the simplifying assumption that the hospital is chosen without regard for the price paid by the insurer. To include the price variable one has to address three problems. First, the observed price is a "list price" for the relevant hospital discharge. Prices actually paid by the insurer are list prices multiplied by a proprietary discount. To address this issue we import data on the average hospital discount from hospital …nancial reports. The true discount could vary across insurers and we treat that in two complementary ways: we allow for errors in our price variable and present results which use additional data to estimate the variation in discounts across insurers. Second the expected price that generates hospital choices is inherently unobservable. We assume that expectations are on average correct, and construct a price variable which is the average realized price for patients admitted with the same diagnosis and similar severities at that hospital. Those predictions will have estimation error, but the estimation procedure we develop averages those errors out. 1 The third problem relates to price endogeneity: the expected price for a patient with a particular diagnosis is likely to be correlated with the unobserved hospital quality for that diagnosis. We control for these unobservables by developing an estimation procedure which allows for hospital …xed e¤ects that vary freely with severity of diagnosis.
We begin with a standard logit model for hospital choice. This does not allow for errors in the price variable and has a limited ability to allow for hospital …xed e¤ects that vary with severity of diagnosis. We expect the omission of hospital severity interactions to bias the price coe¢ cient upwards, and measurement error in the price measure to bias the price coe¢ cient towards zero.
When we pool all labor and birth discharges we obtain a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient on price. However, when we narrow the sample to the least sick women (a more homogenous diagnosis group) the price coe¢ cient becomes negative. We then allow the price coe¢ cient to vary by insurance carrier and …nd that the carriers with the highest proportion of payments to physicians made through capitation contracts have negative signi…cant price coe¢ cients while other carriers with a higher proportion of fee-for-service contracts have insigni…cant coe¢ cients on price. Since neither endogeneity nor errors in variables are fully addressed by this technique we doubt that the estimates obtained here accurately measure the true responses to price.
So we develop a methodology that addresses these problems. It is based on revealed preference:
we assume that the hospital chosen for each patient generates greater expected utility than any of the other hospitals in her choice set. The utility function is assumed to be additively separable in the price paid by the insurer, distance, and an insurer and severity speci…c hospital quality. We identify pairs of patients who have the same severity and are enrollees in the same insurer but who chose di¤erent hospitals. By de…ning the alternative of each patient as the chosen hospital of the other and summing the two patients'inequalities, we di¤erence out the severity-hospital interaction terms from the utility equation. By averaging the resulting inequalities over patients and hospitals we eliminate the e¤ects of errors in price measurement. The result is a relatively straightforward estimator of bounds on the (normalized) price coe¢ cient. 2 The estimates indicate that the price coe¢ cients are far more negative than in the logit analysis and are ordered with respect to the plans'capitation rates. We show that these results are robust to a number of perturbations to the speci…cation used in the estimation. We then use the price coe¢ cients to back out bounds on the plan, hospital, and severity speci…c quality terms and …nd them to be highly correlated across plans. We therefore add structure and estimate a model where the quality terms for the di¤erent plans are a¢ ne transforms of one another. This allows us to represent preferences as a linear function of price, quality, and distance which di¤ers across plans only in the coe¢ cients of these variables. As a result we can examine how the trade-o¤s between price, quality and distance vary with capitation rates. Though in absolute value the price coe¢ cient varies directly with the capitation rate so does the quality coe¢ cient. Consequently the ratio, or trade-o¤, between price and quality is evaluated in much the same way across plans. In contrast the trade-o¤ between distance and price is evaluated di¤erently. That is highly capitated more price sensitive plans tend to send their patients longer distances to obtain the same quality service at a lower price (but do not trade-o¤ costs against quality di¤erently).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relevant previous literature. Section 3 describes important features of the market and Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 sets out the full model we wish to analyze, Sections 6 and 7 summarize the restrictions required for the logit and inequalities methods and set out their results, Section 8 considers the trade-o¤ between price, quality and distance, and Section 9 concludes.
Previous Literature
Two sets of previous papers are relevant for our analysis. The …rst, summarized by Glied (2000) , considers HMO gatekeeping and cost controls. Glied's summary suggests that HMOs have lower inpatient admissions and costs than other insurers; however these papers do not analyze the relationship between hospital price and referrals. 3 There are a few more recent studies that consider similar questions. For example, Cutler et al (2000) compare the treatment of heart disease in HMOs and traditional insurance plans and …nd that HMOs have 30% to 40% lower expenditures.
Virtually all the di¤erence comes from lower unit prices rather than di¤erences in actual treatments. However they do not investigate whether price reductions are due to lower negotiated prices within a hospital or to referring patients to cheaper hospitals (the focus of our study). Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor (2004) look in more detail at how HMOs achieve cost savings. They analyze physician responses to group-based …nancial incentive contracts within a single HMO. They …nd 2 The analysis is similar in spirit to previous papers that match treatment to control groups based on observable data and assume that unobserved information does not a¤ect response to treatment. The propensity score literature, and di¤erence-in-di¤erences analyses more generally, fall into this category. See Rosenbaum and Ruben (1983) for propensity score estimators and, for example, Card and Krueger (1994) for di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimators. The framework we use for the analysis of the inequalities is described in more detail in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2011) and Pakes (2010) . 3 More recent reviews by Chandra, Cutler and Song (2012) and McClellan (2011) come to similar conclusions.
that spending on medical utilization, particularly for outpatient services, increases with the size of the physician group receiving group-based incentives. That is, spending is negatively correlated with the intensity of incentives to limit these expenditures. 4 There are also some papers evaluating recent initiatives that implement cost-control incentives like those planned for Accountable Care
Organizations. For example the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) was adopted by Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Massachusetts in 2009. It introduced physician incentives similar to those created by the global capitation contracts in our data. Physician groups entered into …ve year global budget contracts under which they received a budget per enrolled patient and were accountable for costs of all services provided to those patients, including inpatient care. Song, Zafran et al (2011) …nd that, in the …rst year, this initiative was associated with reduced growth in spending on outpatient services and improved quality of care and that most of the savings came from referring patients to lower-priced providers. 5 The second relevant literature estimates discrete choice models of hospital demand: see Gaynor and Vogt (2000) for a survey. 6 Almost all of these papers exclude the price paid by the insurer to the hospital from the utility equation. One exception is Gaynor and Vogt (2003) which uses assumptions to de…ne a price index for each hospital that is included in the utility equation.
However, that paper assumes away interactions between patient characteristics and the attributes of a particular hospital in determining procedures and therefore prices. It also does not consider the impact of physician incentives on the price coe¢ cient.
We conduct a preliminary analysis of the response of physician referrals to capitation payments in Ho and Pakes (2011). There we regress a severity-adjusted price measure on the proportion of the insurer's payments to primary physicians that are capitated and market …xed e¤ects and estimate a negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on the capitation variable. 7 This is consistent with the hypothesis that insurer capitation payments in ‡uence physician referrals. However, simple regressions like these cannot provide more than suggestive evidence since they do not account for the trade-o¤s made between price and other hospital characteristics in the hospital choice equation.
Background on the Market
The analysis in this paper focuses on enrollees of health maintenance organizations (HMOs). 8 The seven largest HMOs had 87% of the California HMO market at the end of 2002. Our analysis 4 Other recent papers considering the responsiveness of health care providers to …nancial incentives include Ketcham, Leger and Lucarelli (2012), Limbrock (2011) and Bajari, Hong, Park and Town (2012). 5 Duggan (2000) considers hospital referrals for Medicaid patients. He …nds that private hospitals in California responded to new …nancial incentives to treat Medicaid patients, by cream-skimming the most pro…table Medicaid patients from publicly-owned hospitals. The reallocation was especially pronounced for pregnant women. 6 Examples include Luft et al (1990) , Burns and Wholey (1992) , Town and Vistnes (2001), Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003)and Ho (2006) , all of which either omit price entirely or include only the list price. 7 We adjust for severity by constructing the following price ratio measure:
where pi is the hospital price for patient i and ps i is the average of that variable for same-severity patients across all hospitals in the sample. 8 The 2003 California medical care market is described in detail in Baumgarten (2004) . Several previous papers describe the contractual arrangements between health plans and physicians in California, including Rosenthal et al (2001) and Grumbach et al (1998a. and b.) .
focuses on six of these seven: we exclude Kaiser Permanente because the prices paid by this vertically integrated insurer to its hospitals are not observed in our data. 9 Each HMO contracts with a network of providers (physicians and hospitals); enrollees are required to seek care only within that network. Each pregnant woman chooses an obstetrician from within the network and is referred to one of the small number of network hospitals with which the obstetrician is a¢ liated. While HMOs could, in theory, in ‡uence hospital referrals for their enrollees by de…ning narrow hospital networks, in practice this is not usually the case. 10 Similarly, HMOs do not generally use hospital payment mechanisms that provide incentives either to control costs or improve quality. Most hospitals in California are paid by the insurance carrier on a per service or per diem basis.
Payment arrangements for physicians, in contrast, are often structured to generate cost-control incentives. Most HMOs contract on a non-exclusive basis with large physician groups, 11 making capitated (…xed) monthly payments to the group for every enrollee who uses it as his or her primary care clinic. The alternative is a fee-for-service payment arrangement. The extent of …nancial risk passed to the medical group varies across capitated contracts. In around 20% of cases the monthly ("global capitation") payment covers all services needed by the physician group's patients including inpatient hospital stays. These physician groups have a clear incentive to refer their patients to lower-cost hospitals. The remaining 80% of capitation contracts involve payments that cover only the cost of services provided by physicians within the group, perhaps with the addition of ancillary services like outpatient medical tests. The HMO makes separate payments to hospitals for providing secondary care. Physician groups again have incentives to control hospital costs because "shared risk arrangements" almost always apply, under which a spending or utilization target is set and cost savings or overruns relative to the target are shared between the physician group and the HMO. 12 These arrangements are very similar to the "shared savings" arrangements instituted for Accountable Care Organizations: the ACO will be eligible to share in any cost savings made relative to a pre-agreed benchmark if the savings exceed a minimum level of approximately 2 percent. 13 Our dataset does not distinguish between global and non-global capitation arrangements. We investigate the extent to which referrals from physician groups with more highly capitated contracts of any kind are more (or less) sensitive to price. We also do not observe the physician or physician group referring each patient to a hospital. We do see the name of each patient's insurer and the 9 The insurers we do consider are Blue Cross, Blue Shield, Health Net, Paci…care, Aetna and CIGNA. Blue Cross of California is independent of other Blue plans, including Blue Shield of California.
1 0 Ho (2006) …nds that on average 83% of hospitals were included in each HMO's network in a sample of 43 large markets (including seven in California) in 2003. Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) report similar evidence. Our analysis conditions on the provider network of each insurer in our data. 1 1 There are two types of physician groups: medical groups and Independent Practice Associations (IPAs). See Appendix 1 for details. 1 2 Rosenthal et al (2001) note that 85-90% of non-global capitation revenues were generated from contracts with shared hospital risk. Robinson and Casalino (2001) report similar …ndings. Fee-for-service contracts do not generally involve shared hospital risk arrangements. 1 3 The details of these arrangements apply to ACOs set up for the Medicare program. They are not directly relevant to our analysis because Medicare prices are essentially …xed across hospitals. However ACOs are already being established for privately insured patients. Prices paid by private insurers vary substantially across hospitals. percent of each insurer's primary services and other medical professional services that are capitated.
In the analysis below we compare the importance of price in determining the hospital choice for patients enrolled in high-capitation insurers to its importance for those in low-capitation insurers.
Our …nding that referrals from high capitation insurers tend to be to less costly hospitals could be due to individual physicians referring capitated patients to cheaper hospitals and non-capitated patients to others (which is consistent with Melichar, 2009 ), or to more cost conscious physicians being associated with physician groups that are more highly capitated. Physicians in more highly capitated physician groups could be more cost conscious either because they respond to incentives they face in those groups, or because inherently cost conscious doctors gravitate towards high capitation groups. Our data does not allow us to distinguish between these alternative mechansims. all Knox Keene plans (essentially the same as HMOs) in California. We consider only admissions records for women in labor and only private Knox Keene enrollees. 15 Our analysis covers only the six largest insurers other than Kaiser Permanente: these make up over 96% of the non-Kaiser observations in the data. We infer the hospital network of each insurer using the discharge data by assuming that a hospital is in the network if at least 3 patients are admitted from the particular insurer. 16 Consistent with Kessler and McClellan (2000) , we assume that patients consider traveling 1 4 We have a Private Use version of the data in which patient zip code, age, race and gender are not masked. 1 5 Knox Keene plans are de…ned as plans that are overseen by the California Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) and subject to the Knox Keene Act. They are not precisely the same as HMOs: while most insurers designate only their HMO plans as Knox Keene plans, Blue Shield and Blue Cross PPO products were also included in this category in 2003. We cannot distinguish between PPO and HMO enrollees for these two insurers at the individual discharge level. Capitation rates are also reported for the full Knox Keene plan. This likely generates some of the cross-insurer variation in capitation rates in the data; it is not a problem for us provided we control for other di¤erences between HMO and PPO plan types in our analysis. We do this by dropping hospitals to which very few patients are admitted for these two insurers (hoping thereby to remove out-of-network hospitals from the data). We also note that di¤erences in out-of-pocket pricing policies in PPOs (sometimes requiring patients to pay a coinsurance rate rather than a copay that is …xed across hospitals) is likely to bias our estimates towards …nding no di¤erence in price coe¢ cients between high-and low-capitation insurers. See discussion in Appendix 1 for details. 1 6 We check the implied network de…nitions against hand-collected data (described in detail in Ho (2006) ) from seven California markets in 2003. The de…nition is conservative: that is, the networks implied by our methodology contain fewer hospitals than the networks in the hand-collected data and if an implied network contains a particular up to 35 miles to visit a general hospital and up to 100 miles to visit a teaching hospital.
We do not observe the price charged to the insurer by the hospital, and, as a result, have to construct our price variable. Our data does include the list price for every discharge. List prices are a standard set of prices listed by hospitals in each year for all their services. All patients are quoted the same list price for the same service. However, only uninsured patients and some patients using an out-of-network provider are actually asked to pay the list price, and even they are frequently o¤ered a discount by the hospital. Each insurance company has a contract with each provider in its network that de…nes a discount from the list price for its enrollees. We also observe the average negotiated discount at the hospital level, calculated as the total contractual adjustments from private managed care payors divided by the total charges (the sum of list prices for all inpatient and outpatient episodes) for the relevant hospital-year. 17 The price we need to construct is the price that the decision-maker expects to pay for a given entering diagnosis or severity level. We assume that expected prices are on average correct, and construct a baseline price variable as the average realized list price for a given severity in a particular hospital multiplied by 1 minus the average hospital discount. Since our estimation methodology relies only on averages over agents, any remaining expectational error should average out when we sum across severities. 18 We demonstrate below that there is meaningful variation in this price measure both across patients of di¤erent sickness levels and across hospitals. However, it is clearly subject to measurement problems. There is a trade-o¤ between aggregation error, if our groups of similar patients for the expected list price calculation are de…ned too broadly, and measurement error if they are too narrow implying small sample problems. We return to this issue below. There may also be speci…cation error since we observe the discount at the hospital rather than the hospital-insurer level. 19 We examine the robustness of our results to speci…cation error in the price variable in Section 7 and Appendix 2. There we use additional data on the share of each hospital's total inpatient revenues coming from each insurer to estimate a model of the discount as a function of hospital, insurer and market characteristics. We then repeat our inequalities analysis using price measures derived from the estimated discount, and …nd only minor di¤erences in our results. Table 1 sets out summary data on the six insurers included in the analysis; data for Kaiser are also included for comparison. These data give a broader picture of the insurers we consider than can hospital it is also included in the hand-collected data in the vast majority of cases. 1 7 Both variables are recorded in the hospital's …nancial statements. 1 8 We take averages over patients who enter the hospital with a given severity level. Our de…nitions of severities di¤er across our model speci…cations and are detailed below. Gaynor and Vogt (2003) use a similar methodology, de…ning price as the observed list price multiplied by 1 minus the average discount. 1 9 Speci…cation error is also generated because the observed value is an average for both inpatient and outpatient services and for all managed care payors (including Point of Service plans) rather than just for Knox Keene inpatient events. If variation in discounts across insurers and plan types is known to physicians this speci…cation error will generate selection bias in our estimates. This issue is addressed in the analysis in Section 7 and Appendix 2.
Summary Statistics
be provided by our speci…c dataset. Since the e¤ect of capitation payments on the price coe¢ cient will be identi…ed from variation across these six insurers, our goal here is to summarize the di¤er-ences between them on other relevant dimensions. independent of the association and each other. They were no longer tax exempt and could be forpro…t corporations. In California Blue Cross was an investor-owned for-pro…t organization with a lower medical loss ratio (de…ned as medical and hospital expenses divided by premium revenues for the whole insurer) and similar inpatient utilization to other insurers in the market. Blue Shield was still quite di¤erent from the other insurers we consider. It was the only not-for-pro…t company we analyzed and had relatively high inpatient utilization …gures (although its premiums and medical loss ratio were quite low). As a result Blue Shield's administrators and physicians may have been less receptive to …nancial incentives than those of other insurers, an issue we return to below. 21 There are 38 hospitals in the average patient's choice set. 27% of discharges are from teaching hospitals. The average price paid (approximated as list price*(1-average discount)) is $4,317 for labor admissions. The average length of stay is 2.5 days. The importance of the distance between the patient's home and her hospital is clear from the raw data. The average distance between a patient and a hospital in her choice set is 24.6 miles; the average distance to the chosen hospital is 6.7 miles. Distance will be an important variable in the utility equation estimated below.
2 0 Capitation payments for primary professional services are de…ned in the HMO Annual Financial Statements as "capitation costs incurred by the reporting entity to primary care physicians, dentists and other professionals for the delivery of medical services". They include capitation payments to obstetricians. 2 1 This is the sample used for the logit analysis. We follow the previous literature by accounting for all hospitals in the choice set for that analysis. Average discount data is missing for some hospitals; we …ll it in using regression analysis. We exclude these hospitals from the inequalities analysis because pairwise comparisons between hospitals on which we have complete price information are su¢ cient for the inequality estimation procedure. For similar reasons we also exclude the small number of hospitals reporting more than 5% capitated revenues. We are left with 64,691 patients and 157 hospitals. Using this smaller sample for the logits has no qualitative e¤ect on the estimates.
The table also records means for three potential measures of outcomes: death while in hospital, transfer to an acute care setting (at this hospital or a di¤erent hospital) and transfer to a skilled nursing facility (again at either this or a di¤erent hospital). These are useful inputs to an initial investigation of the patterns in the data although we will not use them in our full model. The average probability of each event is low for labor admissions: 0.01% for death, 0.3% for acute care transfer and 1.5% for transfer to a skilled nursing facility. Table 3 demonstrates that the variation in price and in outcomes across patient ages and comorbidities is intuitive. Here we add both data on infant outcome variables and data that follows both mother and baby over time which enables us to calculate the probability of readmission within a 12 month period 22 . We also aggregate the probabilities of death, acute care transfer and skilled nursing facility transfer into a single probability of discharge to a location other than home.
Comparing older to younger women who give birth, we …nd that the birthing episodes of women who are aged over 40 are signi…cantly more expensive and that these older women have higher probabilities of readmission within 12 months and of discharge to "other than home" than younger women. Also the infants of the older woman incur signi…cantly larger hospital expenses and are signi…cantly more likely to be discharged to "other than home". Interestingly infant readmission probabilities are not signi…cantly di¤erent across these two groups. 23 We use the Charlson score (Charlson et al, 1987 ) as a measure of patient severity: this assigns integer-valued weights (from 0 to 6) to comorbidities other than principal diagnosis where higher weights indicate higher severity. The weights are summed to generate a single integer-valued index. A patient with both diabetes and renal disease would have a score of 3. The index was developed by physicians and is widely used to measure severity based on diagnoses listed in patient records. Table   3 indicates that women with higher Charlson scores in our data, and their infants, had more costly deliveries and higher probabilities of adverse outcomes than women with lower Charlson scores. All of these di¤erences are signi…cant at p=0.05. Our analysis will allow the Charlson score, interacted with other severity measures such as age and principal diagnosis, to a¤ect preferences for di¤erent hospitals.
The Model
As noted the hospital chosen is a result of a complex decision process. The woman …rst chooses an obstetrician, typically with knowledge of which hospitals the obstetrician can admit patients to, and then the obstetrician, in consultation with the patient, chooses among the hospitals where he has admitting privileges. We assume this process generates an ordering of hospitals which is derived from the patient's and doctor's preferences. The patient's preferences are a¤ected by the distance from her home to the hospital, her assessment of the severity of her condition, and by the hospital's (observed and unobserved) characteristics. The physician's choice is in ‡uenced by the patient's preferences, his assessment of the severity of the patient's condition and the quality of the hospital services for that severity, and the price charged by the hospital to the insurer. The potentially observable part of the preference function whose maximum determines the hospital (h) that patient i of insurer is allocated to, is assumed to take the additively separable form
where p(c i ; h; ) is the price insurer is expected to pay at hospital h for a patient who enters with condition (or diagnosis) c i , s i is a measure of the severity of the patient's diagnosis q h (s) is a vector of perceived qualities of hospital h, one for each di¤erent diagnosis severity,
is the plan and severity speci…c function which determines the importance of the perceived severity-speci…c quality of di¤erent hospitals, and l i is patient i's location, l h is hospital h's location, d( ) provides the distance between the two locations, and f ( ) is an increasing function of that distance, for i = 1; : : : ; n ;s , h = 1; : : : H, and = 1; : : : . When implementing alternative estimation strategies we will add an unobserved (or disturbance) term whose properties will be assumed to di¤er across those strategies.
The function g ( ) is allowed to di¤er arbitrarily: across plans, among sickness levels for a given hospital, and across hospitals. It therefore allows particular hospitals to have higher quality for some sickness levels than for others, and permits physicians to di¤er in their intensity of preferences for quality relative to price and distance when considering patients of di¤erent sickness levels. For some of the speci…cations we will have to constrain g ( ) to be a parametric function of patient and hospital characteristics. To the extent that the parametric assumption does not capture all the variance in g ( ) the residual variance will create an additional unobservable that may bias the other parameters of interest. In particular if the "unobserved quality" represented by this residual is correlated with price we would expect it to cause a positive bias in the price coe¢ cient.
Finally note that when we allow g ( ) to di¤er by insurer (by ), we allow di¤erent insurers to trade-o¤ perceived hospital quality and costs di¤erently, and we allow consumers to respond to these di¤erences and select across insurers accordingly.
Logit Analysis
We begin with a multinomial logit model of hospital choice, as it provides a familiar way of investigating the patterns in the data. The logit model makes the following assumptions.
where lp o (c i ; h) is the average list price of patients who enter hospital h with diagnosis c i and o h is one minus the average discount rate hospital h gives managed care providers,
where q h are hospital …xed e¤ects, x(s i ) are functions of the sickness level of the patient and z h are hospital characteristics, both of which are speci…ed below, and
Adding the disturbance " i; ;h , and substituting into equation (1) the logit model becomes
The properties of the model are completed by assuming our composite agent knows " i; ;h at the time the hospital choice is made, and the vector of disturbances has a distribution, conditional on the other right hand side variables, which is i.i.d. Type 1 extreme value. Notice that since we have not indexed an "outside" option, the logit analysis conditions on women who only consider giving birth at a hospital. We estimate this model using maximum likelihood.
We consider three di¤erent assumptions regarding the price coe¢ cient p; , in the estimation
where pcap is the insurer's capitation rate.
Equation (2) states that the price is exactly equal to our measure of the expected list price multiplied by one minus the observed average discount. I.e. this speci…cation assumes no measurement error in price. We de…ne the expected list price to be the average list price for the particular hospital over patients with the same age (categories 11-19, 20-39, 40-49 and 50-64), principal diagnosis (21 categories for women in labor including, for example, "normal delivery", "previous Cesarean Section" and "early labor"), Charlson score and diagnosis generating the Charlson score. Both principal diagnosis and Charlson score are based only on diagnoses known on admission. We are constrained to using these fairly broad de…nitions of similar patients because we encounter small sample problems when we de…ne narrower groups. To the extent that either the aggregation generates measurement error in our price measure, and/or the small cell sizes generate estimation error in our estimate of expected price, we expect an attenuation bias in the estimated price coe¢ cient.
Equation (3) restricts the g ( ) term in a way consistent with the previous literature: we assume it is determined by a hospital …xed e¤ect plus interactions between hospital characteristics and patient characteristics that are known on admission and expected to be correlated with severity.
In the inequalities analysis below we de…ne over 100 patient severity groups and allow these to freely interact with hospital …xed e¤ects. We can not do this in the logit analysis because it would imply estimating almost 20,000 coe¢ cients and a similar number of expected price terms (without error), putting us in a range of values where an incidental parameter problem, similar to that described in Neyman and Scott (1948) , would make coe¢ cient estimates inconsistent. So we assume the interaction terms are determined by linear interactions between hospital and consumer diagnostic characteristics. Included in z h are the number of nurses per bed and indicators for teaching hospitals, for-pro…t hospitals and hospitals that o¤er transplant services (a proxy for high-tech hospitals). We also include a measure of the quality of labor and birth services taken from Ho (2006): hospitals were rated on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 indicated that no labor/birth services were provided and a higher rating indicated that a less common (assumed to be highertech) service was o¤ered. The patient characteristics in x i are the expected probabilities of death in hospital and of transfer to acute care setting or skilled nursing facility given the patient's age group, principal diagnosis and Charlson score.
While these interactions, like those used in the previous literature, are sensible given the constraints imposed by the methodology, we do not expect them to be su¢ cient to fully address the price endogeneity issue noted above. To the extent they do not there will be an error in the approximation in equation (3) so that equation becomes
The logits assume e (q h (s); s i ) 0. If hospital quality is regarded as more important for more severely ill women and hospital quality is positively correlated with hospital price, we would expect this error to bias the price coe¢ cient upwards. Note, however, that if we only consider the data on one severity group of woman, that is if we …x s i = s , then the error is constant for each hospital and captured by the hospital …xed e¤ect thereby mitigating this source of omitted variable bias.
The logit analysis assumes that both the distance coe¢ cient and the quality-severity interaction terms do not vary across insurers. We begin by also assuming a common price coe¢ cient across insurers. After presenting these results, we provide another set of results which partially controls for the omitted variation in patient-severity hospital-quality interactions by restricting our attention to the least sick patients in our data. For comparison we also estimate separately on the rest of the sample, a group with a more diverse set of severity conditions. Finally we let the price coe¢ cient di¤er across insurers and investigate whether there is a signi…cant relationship between the percent of the insurer's payments to primary physicians that are capitated and the price coe¢ cient.
Logit Results
A summary of the results is reported in Table 4 . The price coe¢ cients, price interaction terms and distance coe¢ cients are reported, together with the sample size, for each speci…cation. In each case the distance coe¢ cient is negative and highly signi…cant, with a magnitude that is consistent with estimates from the previous literature. 24 However the price coe¢ cient from the full sample of labor/birth discharges is positive and signi…cant with a t-value of approximately 5. Recall that we would expect a positive bias in that coe¢ cient if high priced hospitals were high quality hospitals, and the severity-hospital interactions we included were not su¢ cient to control for hospital quality conditional on the severities that determined hospital choice. To see if this might be the source of a problem, the next column provides the results from the same speci…cation when we restrict the sample to the least-sick women. These are de…ned as women in labor who are aged 20-39, have a Charlson score of 0, and whose principal diagnosis and comorbidities are de…ned by obstetrical experts to be "routine". Our sample contains 43,742 of these patients. Since they have similar severities we would expect there be less variance across patients in the importance of hospital quality di¤erences, and this should mitigate the omitted variable bias.
When we use the sample of less sick woman, the price coe¢ cient becomes negative (magnitude -0.017) and marginally signi…cant (standard error 0.009). The same speci…cation on the subsample with the sickest patients, the group of patients where we think the quality severity interactions are likely to be both more variant and more important in determining hospital choice, yields a positive price coe¢ cient again (of .012), and this time with a t-value of 6. We conclude that we need a better way to control for hospital quality/patient severity interactions.
Next we look for interactions between price and insurer …xed e¤ects. Insurers in the interaction between price and the percent capitation in the insurer, the price coe¢ cient is positive and the interaction term negative with almost twice the magnitude of the price coe¢ cient. Both are highly signi…cant; the t-value of the capitation interaction is 7.7.
When we do the same exercise with the subsample of sicker patients, the price-insurer interaction term is still negative for Paci…care, although insigni…cant at p=0.05 and smaller in magnitude than for the healthier population. All other insurers' price coe¢ cients are positive and three out of …ve are statistically signi…cant, again pointing to the need for a better way to control for hospital quality/patient severity interactions. The third speci…cation, including a price-percent capitation interaction, again generates a positive price coe¢ cient and a negative interaction term (implying that insurers that favor capitated payments generate physician referrals that are more price-based than those of other physicians). However, the magnitudes are much more similar than for the least sick sample and the implied overall price coe¢ cient is positive even for insurers with 100% capitated payments to primary physicians.
We now go back to the sample with the least sick patients and look for the implications of the logit analysis for the relative magnitudes of the distance and price e¤ects. Consider …rst the distance coe¢ cient. We calculate the impact of a one mile increase in distance for hospital h, holding all else …xed, on the probability that a particular patient i visits that hospital. We then take the average over patients and a weighted average over hospitals. The average e¤ect of the one mile distance increase is a 13.7% reduction in the probability that the hospital is chosen. 25 Next we conduct a similar exercise to evaluate the magnitude of the price e¤ect. Consider Paci…care, the insurer with the most negative estimated price coe¢ cient. The average e¤ect of a $1000 increase in a hospital's price, holding all other prices constant, is a 5.2% reduction in the probability that the hospital is chosen. So the price increase we would require in order to compensate for a one mile increase in distance would be approximately $2,600. This is more than two thirds the average price for the less-sick patients (which is $3380 and has a standard deviation of $1870.) All the other insurers'price coe¢ cients are considerably less negative, implying a considerably larger price distance tradeo¤. These numbers accentuate our worry that omitted variable and errors in variables may be causing important biases in our estimates.
Inequalities
As noted we are worried that the logit analysis does not fully control for variation in quality conditional on severity and that this might cause a positive bias in the price coe¢ cient. In addition that analysis compelled us to use average prices within quite broadly-de…ned patient groups because narrower groups would increase the variance in our estimated price accentuating the impact of measurement error in price. We now develop an estimation method that addresses both the absence of adequate controls for quality conditional on severity and measurement errors in the price variable.
The method is based on a revealed preference inequality: it is assumed that the chosen hospital is preferred to feasible alternative hospitals. Patients are assigned to detailed severity groups. We consider all couples of same-insurer, same-severity patients whose chosen hospitals di¤er but both of whose choices were feasible for both agents. Within each couple we sum the inequalities obtained from the fact that each patient preferred her choice to the choice made by the other. Since the severity-hospital interactions from the two inequalities are equal but opposite in sign, when we sum the inequalities the interaction terms di¤erence out. Revealed preference implies that this sum is positive, and this constrains the remaining parameters.
More formally let S (h; h 0 ; s) be the set of patients from plan with severity s who chose hospital h but had hospital h 0 in their choice set. For notational simplicity for any x(i; h) let
Then the observable part of our inequalities is formed by taking couples of patients i 2 S (h; h 0 ; s) and i 0 2 S (h 0 ; h; s) and using equation (1) to form
We then average over all couples i 2 S (h; h 0 ; s) and i 0 2 S (h 0 ; h; s) for all h 0 6 = h.
Since we have removed the quality/severity interaction terms and no longer need to estimate their coe¢ cients we can de…ne our severity groups at a more detailed level than was possible in the logit analysis. Moreover when we average over all such couples to form the moments which determine the estimator, we eliminate the e¤ects of estimation error in price so we can de…ne the price terms in as narrow a set of price groupings as we like. Note, however, that this procedure does rely on the expected price varying within a hospital across patients who have the same severity of illness; otherwise the price terms will be di¤erenced out along with the interaction terms.
Severity and Price Groups
Our severity groupings are chosen following the advice of obstetrical experts at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital. They are de…ned by the interaction between age, principal diagnosis, Charlson score, diagnosis generating the Charlson score and a sub-category de…ned by the rank of the most serious comorbidity, other than principal diagnosis, that is listed in the discharge record. The obstetrical experts assessed the list of principal diagnoses and comorbidities in our data, assigning each a rank from 1 to 3. A "1" indicated a routine diagnosis (such as normal birth or immunization of the newborn) and "3" indicated something more serious; see Appendix 3 for a complete list. The obstetricians advised us that the number of comorbidities of a given rank, conditional on severity, was unlikely to a¤ect the hospital choice. While a physician might refer a pregnant woman with a comorbidity of rank 2 (such as hepatitis or a thyroid disorder) to a di¤erent hospital from a patient with only rank-1 comorbidities, this would be a hospital well-equipped to deal with high-risk pregnancies rather than the speci…c comorbidity, and the presence of two rather than one rank-2 comorbidities would not a¤ect the referral decision. In contrast, our experts agreed that the number of comorbidities of a particular rank would be likely to a¤ect the tests performed and drugs prescribed and therefore the price.
We follow this advice directly and calculate prices as averages for women with the same severity (as just de…ned) who also have the same number of most seriously-ranked comorbidities. The price groupings are therefore more detailed than those used for severity only in that they break out patients by the number of comorbidities of the highest rank as well as the identity of that rank 26 . These de…nitions generate many more groups than those used in the logit analysis. For example, for the …rst insurer in our data, there are 9 populated severity groups and 63 groups de…ning prices using the logit-based categories; there are 106 severities and 272 price groups under the more detailed de…nitions. Table 5 illustrates the variation in prices across price groups for patients with a Charlson score of 0 and a given maximum rank; this is close to the variation in price used to estimate the price coe¢ cient (our severity groups also condition on four age groups and 21 principal diagnoses). 63450
out of 64691 patients in our inequalities sample have a Charlson score of 0. We count the number of such patients in each "maximum rank" group (i.e. these are almost our severity groups) and record the distribution of patients and prices across subgroups de…ned by the number of comorbidities of maximum rank (almost our price groups). The price variation we use in our estimates is essentially the variance across rows within a column. It is easy to see that these are ordered as expected, and the di¤erences are usually highly signi…cant. The variance across columns in any given row is also ordered as expected, but these di¤erences become the between severity group di¤erences in prices and our estimates condition on severity groups. An analysis of variance indicates that moving from severity to price groups explains an additional 12% of the variance in price (from 50% to 62% of the total variance), ensuring there is meaningful variance in price after we condition on our severity groups.
Inequality Analysis
The inequality model makes the following assumptions:
o h lp o (c i ; h) was assumed equal to expected price in the logit analysis, so the di¤erence between this speci…cation and that used in the logit analysis is that the inequality analysis allows for measurement error in price and the logit analysis did not. We assume this error is mean zero conditional on the patient's plan and chosen hospital. Also
i.e., the inequality analysis places no restrictions on the quality severity interactions and allows for classi…cation error in those interactions which is assumed to be mean zero conditional on the patient's plan and chosen hospital. Finally
which di¤ers from the speci…cation in the logit analysis in that the squared term in distance has been eliminated because it did not a¤ect any of the parameters of interest and would complicate the algebra below.
Substituting into equation (7) for a same-plan same-severity couple who could have chosen each other's hospital (an i 2 S (h; h 0 ; s) and i 0 2 S (h 0 ; h; s = s i )) our revealed preference inequality
Then averaging equation (11) over i 2 S(h; h 0 ; s) and i 0 2 S(h 0 ; h; s) we get
The moment inequalities we use in estimation are weighted averages of these inequalities where the weights are given by the fraction of comparisons that each contributes, or
If we let ! P read converges in probability, and note that our assumptions imply
then our model implies that
The inequality in equation (13) is in terms of observables and the parameters of interest but it will not identify separate p; and d; coe¢ cients 27 , so we set d; = 1. This implies that we will only be able to estimate the ratio p; =jj d; jj, which at the risk of some notational confusion, we will henceforth simply call p; 28 .
The inequality in (13) bounds p; . We can generate additional inequalities, and therefore bounds, by multiplying each inequality in equation (11) with an "instrument", say z, whose sign is the same for all observations. The additional moments will generate lower bounds if the expected value of [ p(h; h 0 ; s) + p(h 0 ; h; s)] z is positive and upper bounds otherwise. For a variable to be an instrument it must be known by the agents when their decisions are made and mean independent of the measurement errors. Our instruments are the positive and negative parts, respectively, of the distance di¤erence terms de…ned above:
Details. We conduct the initial analyses separately by insurer. This allows all hospital-quality/ patient-severity interactions as well as the price coe¢ cient to di¤er by plan. The left hand side of equation (13) is computed separately for each hospital. We then weight each of these terms by its estimated standard error and choose as our (set) estimator of p; those values that minimize the sum of squares of the negative parts of the resulting moments. For small hospitals we are concerned that the average error either in the inequality, or more likely in the estimate of its standard error, may not be close to zero. As a result we develop a separate inequality for each hospital that has more than 1000 patient switches but average over all hospitals with less than 1000 patient switches. Overall we have between 73 and 283 moments per insurer: one for each combination of an instrument and a major hospital and an additional moment per instrument that includes hospitals with fewer patients. 29 95% con…dence intervals for the estimates are generated using the method developed in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2011). 30 2 8 The inequality model allows for detailed hospital quality/patient severity interactions and errors in the price variable, but rules out determinants of choice that are patient-hospital speci…c and not controlled for by the severity/quality interactions, price, or distance. The logit model does exactly the reverse. Were we to add a patient-hospital speci…c unobservable to the inequality model, say i;h , the average of E[ i;h;h 0 ji chooses h]+E[ i 0 ;h 0 ;h ji 0 chooses h 0 ] would be added to equation (13) . To the extent that this term is not controlled for by hospital-severity interactons it will induce a selection problem which is expected to narrow the estimated bounds. If the selection term is important enough we will reject the null that there are values of which satisfy all the inequalities. In fact we accept below. If we were willing to ignore the errors in variables problem and constrain the distribution of the idiosyncratic errors we could, at least in principle, implement estimators that accounted for the hospital-quality/patient-severity interactions and idiosyncratic errors. If, in addition, we were willing to make logit-like assumptions on the idiosyncratic errors and computation was not an issue we could use the conditional likelihood estimator in Chamberlain (1980) . However the number of patients in a given hospital would make this computationally infeasible. The estimator in Pakes and Porter (2012) does not restrict the error distribution but only partially identi…es coe¢ cients. We have partially implemented this estimator and have gotten results which are consistent with those presented below, but that have larger con…dence intervals.
Allowing for Within Hospital Variation in Discounts Across Insurers
Our model allows for error in our hospital price measure but assumes that error is mean zero conditional on hospital and plan. This would not be the case if there were important di¤erences in discounts within a hospital across insurers, so we now consider a model that allows us to check for such di¤erences.
Our data include the average negotiated discount at each hospital, our d h . Our procedure for testing whether our results are robust to within-hospital plan-speci…c discounts begins with estimates of a model that explains d h as a function of the share of a hospital's revenues that comes from each insurer interacted with hospital, plan, and market characteristics. The additional data on the insurer-speci…c share of hospital revenues needed for this analysis comes from the OSHPD (2000) and Gaynor and Vogt (2000) provide good reviews of this literature. Several other speci…cations were investigated. For example we replaced the insurer …xed e¤ects with the plan percent capitation. This coe¢ cient was positive and the other coe¢ cient estimates were qualitatively una¤ected by this change, foreshadowing our results that accounting for variation in discounts across insurers does not change the major results of our inequalities analysis. We also investigated whether the proportion of the insurer's patients sent to a particular hospital was correlated with the discount by including an interaction of this proportion with insurer …xed e¤ects in the model. This relationship between the "channeling" of patients to a particular provider and the prices negotiated with that provider is analyzed in Sorensen (2003). When we excluded market …xed e¤ects we estimated a signi…cant positive relationship between patient channeling and discounts (a negative relationship between channeling and prices) for just one insurer, Blue Shield. The coe¢ cient became insigni…cant when we added
Allowing for Errors in Our Distance Measure.
Our measure of the distance between patients and hospitals is the distance between the centroid of the patient's home zip code and the zip code of the hospital. It therefore contains measurement error. Assuming the error is mean zero implies that it does not a¤ect the properties of our original inequality (equation 13) as that simply averages out the estimation error. However when we take the positive and negative parts of the distance and use them as instruments, those instruments will, in general, contain an error which is correlated with the error in distance in the original equation, and this can generate biases in our estimate of p; .
To ensure that this was not having a major impact on our results we modi…ed our distance
We did the analogous transform to the other distance instruments. This addresses the problem if we assume that the error in the distance is not greater than three miles, so that we know the incremental distance between hospitals is positive (negative) if the observed di¤erences are greater than three miles. Table 6 reports results from the inequalities analysis. The …rst column reports our main results.
Inequality Results
These assume that the price measure obtained by multiplying hospital speci…c discounts by the expected list price is correct up to an error which is mean zero conditional on the plan and the choice of hospital. The next two columns use p 1 (:) and p 2 (:) respectively. Their validity requires additional assumptions on the prediction errors generated when forming these variables, but they allow us to investigate whether our results are robust to allowing for plan-speci…c discounts within hospitals. The …nal column uses the modi…ed distance measure described above to check for the possible impacts of errors in the distance measure.
There is no value for p; that satis…es all the inequality constraints in any speci…cation except one (Blue Shield in column 4 of the table). When this occurs the estimation algorithm produces a point estimate: the value of p; that minimizes the sum of squares of the negative part of the (standardized) moments. Given the number of inequalities we have for each of our plans we are not surprised to …nd point estimates. In …nite samples when each moment is evaluated at the true value of the parameter vector it generates a variable which distributes approximately normally.
Consequently the greatest of the values from the moments which provide lower bounds has a positive bias. Similarly the least upper bound has a negative bias. The expected magnitude of these biases increases with the number of moments.
market …xed e¤ects. We repeated the inequalities analysis for Blue Shield using this discount speci…cation and the results changed very little.
There is a standard statistical test for whether sampling errors of this form exist and the results always indicated that we could accept the null that there were values of that satis…ed all the inequalities. are reported in the rows of Table 6 labeled "Drop t < 2".
In the …rst column of Table 6 the price coe¢ cients for all insurers other than Blue Shield are negative and statistically signi…cant at p=0.05. That for Blue Shield is small, negative and statistically insigni…cant. As is traditional for set estimators, we focus on con…dence intervals for p; . These are illustrated for each insurer in Figure 1 . The coe¢ cients for all insurers except Blue Shield are ordered by decreasing percent capitation (that is, the upper bound of the con…dence interval for one insurer is below the lower bound for the insurer with the next-highest percent capitation). The picture is less clear for Blue Shield. Its con…dence interval is above that for Blue Cross and crosses zero.
The results from substituting p 1 (:) and p 2 ( ) for the p o ( ) in the inequality analysis are provided in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 , respectively. They are similar to the results in our main speci…cation. The two major di¤erences occur when using p 2 ( ); then the Health Net coe¢ cient estimated when we drop the two negative moments is larger in absolute value, and the Blue Shield coe¢ cient is positive with a con…dence interval that crosses zero (instead of being negative with a con…dence interval crossing zero). We conducted a number of other robustness tests that involved the price variable, but none had anything but the expected e¤ect on the results 32 .
Column 4 provides the results that use the modi…ed distance instrument that takes account of the possibility of error in our distance measure (it uses thed( ) instruments de…ned in the prior subsection). The results are very similar to those above. All coe¢ cients but those for Blue Shield, and to a lesser extent Health Net are similar to those in column 1. The con…dence interval for Blue Shield indicates that the data are not informative about the Blue Shield price coe¢ cient, and the 3 2 We repeated the inequalities analysis using just the list price (rather than its interaction with the discount). The pattern of results was unchanged in that high-capitation insurers had more negative price coe¢ cients in general than other insurers. However all price coe¢ cients were closer to zero than those in Table 6 , consistent with our expectation that measurement error should a¤ect these results. Our discount analysis made the assumption that discounts were …xed across diagnoses within a hospital-insurer pair, so another robustness test examined whether allowing for di¤erent discounts for labor and birth episodes had an impact on our estimates. Augmenting our baseline discount analysis to allow for a separate discount for these episodes generated a signi…cant coe¢ cient and that implied that births had a 6% higher discount than the average for other diagnoses. When we substituted the discounts that allowed for this e¤ect into the inequality analysis the coe¢ cients di¤ered very little from the baseline speci…cation. We also tried estimating a di¤erent discount for Cesarean sections but the estimated coe¢ cient was not statistically signi…cant.
Health Net coe¢ cient, though always sign…cantly negative, varies in magnitude with whether or not we keep the two inequalities that are signi…cantly negative.
With the possible exception of Blue Shield, these results indicate that the allocation of patients to hospitals responds to the prices the insurer pays those hospitals. Moreover insurers with more capitated payments to physicians have hospital referral processes that place a more negative weight on prices than other insurers. We can not say much about Blue Shield. The bounds for its coe¢ cient are large and vary quite a bit across the speci…cations we tried. Recall that Blue Shield is the only not-for-pro…t insurer in our data, and so might be expected to di¤er. As a result we disregard Blue Shield in the analysis that follows.
The di¤erence between the inequality results and those from the logit analysis are striking.
To get an idea of the importance of this di¤erence Table 8 compares the elasticity of price with respect to distance computed using the logit estimates for the least sick patients (table 4), to those same elasticities computed using the price coe¢ cient estimated from the inequalities (column 1 of table 6). That is, we measure on average how much further the consumer would have to drive (in percentage terms) to just o¤set a one percent price increase.
Consider …rst the comparison of elasticities derived from the logit price coe¢ cients to those derived from the inequality estimates for the plans where the logits estimated a negative price coe¢ cient. All the elasticities obtained from the inequality estimates are more than an order of magnitude larger than those obtained from the logit estimates, and some are more than two orders of magnitude larger. In addition two of the elasticities obtained from the logit estimates have the wrong sign. Notice also that the inequality estimates indicate that the average elasticity increases by almost a factor of four when we move from the least capitated for pro…t insurer (Blue Cross) with a capitation rate of 38% to Paci…care whose capitation rate is 97%.
Cost, Quality, and Distance Trade-O¤s
This section is divided into two parts. In the …rst we derive insurer and severity speci…c estimates of quality di¤erences across hospitals. The estimated qualities are quite similar across insurers. We illustrate this by estimating a model which requires the within-severity ratings of di¤erent plans to be a¢ ne transforms of each other, and then providing a plot of the restricted on the unrestricted quality estimates. The next subsection examines implications of these results. When the withinseverity orderings are a¢ ne transforms of each other each plan's preference ordering over hospitals (equation 1) is a di¤erent linear function of price, distance, and a common quality index. This allows us to investigate how the quality-price-distance trade-o¤ varies across insurers. We conclude this subsection by comparing our results on these trade-o¤s to the implications of the data on the outcome measures (in table 2).
Plan and Severity Speci…c Hospital Quality Terms
The revealed preference inequality in equation (11) implies that any given value of p; generates a set of bounds for di¤erences in the quality terms across hospitals. We evaluate these di¤erences at the estimates of p; given in column 1 of Table 6 . 33 Since we can only recover di¤erences in quality and we can only compare hospitals within a market, we estimate quality coe¢ cients that are: plan, severity, and market speci…c. To ease notation we will omit the plan and market indices below.
Recall that x(h; h 0 ; s) is the average of x(i; h; h 0 ) among the patients with severity s who chose hospital h but could have chosen h 0 . Then since every one of those patients chose h over h 0 revealed preference implies 
across observations in S(h; h 0 ; s), and N h;h 0 ;s is the cardinality of that set. Estimating the quality bounds. Recall that we can only bound di¤erences in hospital quality. So we set one hospital's quality to be zero (the same hospital in each insurer for a given severity and market). Indexing that hospital by H one can show that the inequalities that relate to hospital h are given by q(h; s) min
We stack these inequalites for each hospital, weight each by its estimated standard error, and then …nd the (set) estimator that minimizes the squared inequality violations.
Recall that we used very detailed severity groups for the estimation of price coe¢ cients so as to ensure we eliminated biases that might be caused by unobserved quality terms. The sample sizes associated with those groups are quite small, and, at any rate, we are not interested in orderings of hospitals at that …ne a level of severity. We therefore use the severity classi…cations given to us by the obstetricians we consulted to aggregate into …ve "super-severity" groups. These consist of four groups all of whose patients have identical principal diagnosis and comorbidity rankings, and a …fth group which contains all the remaining patients 35 . Finally the actual estimates of the quality bounds depend on the prior estimates of p; . The results presented below use the point estimates from the …rst column of Table 6 , but the implied quality bounds varied very little when we considered other points within their respective con…dence intervals.
In computing the quality estimates we included moments for patients who went to hospital h but could have chosen hospital h 0 for a given severity if there were …ve or more patients who were admitted to hospital h and had hospital h 0 in their choice set. Over our 12 markets and …ve severity groups, we obtained 1176 quality estimates 36 . Almost all of these estimates, 1078 of them, come from our …ve largest markets (Los Angeles, Orange County, Inland Empire, the Bay Area, and San Diego), so we con…ne the remainder of the analysis to these …ve markets.
Does the implied order make logical sense? For the ordering across hospitals to make logical sense it must obey transitivity. There are at least two ways we can check this, one of which does not rely on our estimates of the price coe¢ cient and one of which does.
Temporarily ignore estimation error. Then if both p(h; h 0 ; s) and d(h; h 0 ; s) are positive the perceived quality of h for severity s must be higher than that of h 0 . This because patients chose hospital h over h 0 despite the fact that h was both more distant and had higher prices. This fact generates a partial ordering across hospitals that does not require either estimates of the price coe¢ cients or estimates of the quality terms. Alternatively we could use our estimate of p; to ask whether the partial order obtained from the sign of ( p; p(h; h 0 ; s) d(h; h 0 ; s)) for each pair (h; h 0 ) obeys transitivity.
The order we obtain from using either of these sets of inequalities need not satisfy the logical condition of transitivity. I.e. there could be cycles of the form
To check this we compute all possible cycles from the both the "non-parameteric" bounds and the bounds that use our estimates of p for each of our …ve insurers, in each of our …ve markets for 3 5 The super-severity groups are: Group I contains 55% of patients who have a rank 1 (routine) principal diagnosis, rank 1 comorbidities and are young; Group II has 15% of patients who have rank 1 principal diagnosis, maximum rank 2 comorbidities and are young; Group III has 12% of patients and they have a rank 2 principal diagnosis, maximum rank 2 comorbidities and young; Group IV has 11% of patients who have rank 2 principal diagnosis, rank 1 comorbidities and young; and Group V has 6% of patients that are not included in the other groups. 3 6 477 of these were sets and 699 were points. We tested whether each satis…ed the appropriate vector of moment inequality constraints. Slightly more than half did. However when we go to switches between individual hospitals for a given severity and plan there is a limited amount of data per moment. So the asymptotic approximation inherent in the moment inequality test statistic is questionnable. Moreover, as we show below the actual estimates satisfy most of the properties our priors might associate with them. 3 7 Even more simply we could …nd that h1 h2 and h2 h1: each of our …ve severities. The non-parametric procedure yields only 543 possible orderings, and none violate transitivity. When we use our estimates of p and the estimation algorithm described above there are 10,526 possible orderings, and of these 1069, or about 11% actually cycle. However almost all of these are associated with bounds that are estimated imprecisely. Only 3 or .03% of the possible cycles are signi…cantly negative at the 5% level. We take this as evidence that the data generates a hospital ordering that satis…es rationality constraints. We now consider that ordering in more detail.
Similarity of the implied orders across plans. 1078 estimates is still too many to examine individually, and our primary interest is not in the quality estimates per se but in the implied trade-o¤ between price, quality, and distance. Moreover the similarity in the estimated rankings of hospitals across insurers within our severity groups is striking, and this implies that some aggregation across plans is warranted. Note that since patients are assigned to a unique insurer, there is no statistical relationship between the moments used for the di¤erent insurers (except the relationship due to our using the same price measure across insurers). The similarity in ranks is a result of the similarity in (almost) statistically independent quality estimates generated by the referral processes of the di¤erent plans. 
for the quality terms into equation (15) , and re-estimate. When we do this the 0 coe¢ cients can not be separated from the quality of the reference hospital in each market and, since we can only compare quality estimates across plans, the ;m;s can only be analyzed proportionately to those of a base plan. Consequently in what follows we set the ;m;s coe¢ cient for Blue Cross equal to one in each market and severity.
When we impose the constraints in equation (16) we estimate 452 coe¢ cients. Figure 2 plots the constrained against the unconstrained estimates. The …tted line captures 98.2% of the variance of the unconstrained estimates 38 . We then imposed the futher constraint that
This reduced the number of parameters estimated to 380. Figure 3 plots the constrained against the unconstrained estimates after imposing the additonal constraint. The …tted line now captures 95.7%
of the unconstrained variance. Though the di¤erence in …t between …gures 2 and 3 is noticeable, it is rather small; we lose about three hundredths of one percent of the …t per additional constraint.
Moreover if we impose the constraint in equation (17) there is a straightforward way to compare the way di¤erent plans trade-o¤ costs, quality and distance.
Trade-O¤s
We now accept the constraints in equations (16) and ( 17) and substitute the results into the equation which determines hospital choice (equation 1). To get directly at the price-quality and distance-quality trade-o¤s we divide the resulting equation by so Table 9 provides the plan-speci…c estimates of the coe¢ cients in equation (18) .
The …rst two rows of the table reproduce the capitation rates and price coe¢ cients from prior tables. As noted the (absolute value of the) price coe¢ cients are ordered by the capitation rates.
The third row shows that the quality coe¢ cients are also ordered. Moreover the ratio of the price coe¢ cient to the quality coe¢ cient is virtually constant across plans. The fourth row shows that this ratio lies between -0.29 and -0.30 for all …ve plans. In addition this ratio is estimated quite precisely. If we take upper and lower bounds to that ratio obtained by dividing the upper (lower) limit of the con…dence interval for p; by the lower (upper) limit of the con…dence interval for 1= , we …nd that the lower limit only varies between -0.31 and -0.33 while, with the exception of Health Net, the upper bounds vary only between -0.25 and -0.27 (Health Net has an upper bound of -0.16, and as noted earlier our estimates of its values are somewhat sensitive to the precise speci…cation of the price and distance terms). Table 10 provides the estimates of p; = before we impose the constraint in equation (17); i.e. for each market and severity separately. There we see that Table 9 does hide some variance in the estimates of the parameter determining the cost-quality trade-o¤ across markets and severities.
However the di¤erence between these numbers and those for p; = in Table 9 is largely in the smaller markets and severities. As a result when we impose the constraint in (17), the LA, Bay Area, and (to a lesser extent) Orange County moments for the …rst three severities dominate, and they do not di¤er much across either plans or severities.
The ratio of the price to the quality coe¢ cient represents the trade-o¤ between costs and quality. What the estimates are telling us is that the cost-quality trade-o¤ is, as far as we can tell, independent of the capitation rate. This despite the fact that the higher the capitation rate the more sensitive hospital referrals are to price. Apparently though the high capitation plans are willing to send their patients to further away hospitals to save on hospital costs, they are not willing to sacri…ce quality for cost savings. The trade-o¤ between cost, quality and distance only di¤ers between plans in the trade-o¤ between patient convenience and cost, not between quality and cost.
Of course our "quality"measure is simply whatever is implicit in the referral process. However our results do seem to be consistent with a notion of quality of care as measured by the data on adverse outcomes. Table 3 showed that older and sicker women had signi…cantly higher probabilities of readmission within 12 months and of discharge to "other than home" than other patients, and their infants were also more likely to be discharged to "other than home". Clearly, in order to compare outcome data across plans we need to condition on severity. We calculated 2 test statistics for di¤erences across plans in the probability of each adverse outcome conditional on each of our …ve super-severity groups. Not one of the sixty test statistics was signi…cant at the traditional 5% level.
Conclusions
The results of this paper indicate that the prices paid by insurers to hospitals for obstetric care:
(i) a¤ect allocations of patients across hospitals, and (ii) have an impact which is greater the more highly capitated the insurer. The data do not allow us to investigate the extent to which di¤erent mechanisms drive this e¤ect, so we have to leave that question to future research.
Our second …nding relates to the trade-o¤s made between price, quality and patient convenience.
We …nd that, in the more highly-capitated insurers, price reductions are achieved by sending patients to relatively far-o¤ hospitals. There is no evidence that quality of care, or outcomes, su¤er as a result of this behavior: the trade-o¤ between quality and price is constant across plans while that between convenience and price is not. We noted earlier that the Patient Protection and A¤ordable
Care Act of 2010 endows Accountable Care Organizations with incentives which are similar to those in use for physician groups in California at the time of our study. To the extent that those incentives generate similar behavior, we expect them to lead to hospital cost savings at the expense of patients being referred to more distant hospitals, but not at the expense of other dimensions of hospital quality. Notes: Graph to illustrate con…dence intervals for insurer price coe¢ cients, reported in Table 6 .
Estimates are from model where p(: "discha" is dicharges per 1000 members, "days" is acute days per 1000 members and "Prescrip drugs" is outpatient prescription drug expenses per member per month. excluding Kaiser who are admitted for labor-related diagnoses. "Discounted price" is list price*(1-discount). "Died" is the probability of death while in hospital, "Acute Transfer" the probability of transfer to an acute care setting (in this or a di¤erent hospital) and "Skilled
Nursing Transfer" the probability of transfer to a skilled nursing facility (again at this or a di¤erent hospital). "Std Devn" for "Died", "Acute transfer" and "Skilled Nursing Transfer" are calculated under the assumption that the 0/1 variable is binomially distributed. Notes: Data taken from OSHPD Birth Cohort 2003 (a slightly di¤erent dataset that includes infant outcome variables). "Readmission" is percent of patients readmitted to hospital within 12 months of birth episode. "Not Home" is percent of patients discharged somewhere other than home; this includes transfer to acute care setting, transfer to skilled nursing facility, discharge against medical advice and death. Standard deviations in parentheses; for Readmission and Not Home these are standard errors calculated assuming that the 0/1 variables are binomially distributed. Charlson scores assign weights to comorbidities (known on admission to hospital) other than principal diagnosis where higher weight indicates higher severity. Value 0-6 are observed in the data. "Signif di¤" states signi…cance level at which we cannot reject the hypothesis that the means in the two samples are the same; these are the results of a t-test for price*(1-discount) and a z-test assuming two binomial distributions for Readmission and Not Home. variable summarizing quality of labor services provided) and patient characteristics (probabilities of death while in hospital, transfer to an acute care facility and transfer to a skilled nursing facility conditional on principal diagnosis, age category and Charlson score). shows the number of patients in each "max rank" group and each "number diags of max rank" group. Here "Max rank j" means the maximum rank of a comorbidity for this patient, as de…ned by obstetrical experts at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital, is j. "Number diags of max rank" groups patients according to the number of comorbidities in their discharge record with the relevant max rank. Patients in di¤erent rows of a particular column of the table will have di¤erent price groups. "Price ($)" is the average observed price*(1-discount) for patients in this group; standard errors in parentheses. Notes: Results of inequalities analysis. We include 157 hospitals in total. Estimated coe¢ cient is the ratio of the price coe¢ cient to the distance coe¢ cient in the utility equation, where prices are measured in $000 and distance in tens of miles. Three price measures are used; they are calculated using the observed average hospital discount, and the two estimated hospital-insurer level discounts discussed in Section 7.3, respectively. Speci…cation includes four distance-based instruments (positive and negative parts of d(i
each patient) plus a constant in the instrument set. In Column 4 these instruments are replaced with indicators for distance di¤erences being greater than 3 miles (and used the price measure from Column 1). The rows labeled "drop t -2" report results when we dropped moments whose t-statistic values were less than -2 (2 out of 182 for Health Net; 5 out of 285 for Blue Cross) and repeated the estimation process. "set" for Blue Shield in Column 4 indicates a range of values. 
Under the model all moments should be non-negative. Inequality model uses price de…ned using discount h (Column 1 of Table 5 ). n/a n/a n/a -0.69 -0.290 SD S1
-0. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a LA=Los Angeles, Bay=Bay Area, Ora=Orange County, SD=San Diego,IE=Inland Empire. Our model assumes that hospitals are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis. In reality di¤erent insurers may use di¤erent payment mechanisms to reimburse di¤erent hospitals in their networks.
The major possibility, in addition to fee-for-service payments, is a per-diem payment arrangement under which the hospital receives a …xed number of dollars per day of inpatient stay. We have some information at the hospital and insurer level on the payment mechanisms used but this information is not provided at the discharge level. 40 The weighted average percent of payments that are made on a per-diem basis (where the weight is the number of enrollees in the plan) is fairly low at 21%.
Two of the six carriers in our data, Aetna and Health Net, report no per-diem payments in 2003.
Still, there is clearly some variation in the data in terms of payment mechanisms which will generate measurement error in our price variable.
We note in Section 4 that our dataset does not precisely identify HMO enrollees for every insurer.
Instead it groups together all Knox Keene enrollees for a particular insurer, de…ned as enrollees in plans that are overseen by the California Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) and subject to the Knox Keene Act. All California HMOs are Knox Keene plans. In addition, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield PPO products were Knox Keene plans in 2003, the year of our data. 63% of Blue Shield's Knox Keene enrollees, and 72% of those for Blue Cross, were in the PPO rather than HMO product. We cannot distinguish between PPO and HMO enrollees for these two insurers at the individual discharge level. Capitation rates are also reported for the full Knox Keene plan.
This likely generates some of the cross-insurer variation in capitation rates in the data: PPOs usually pay their physicians on a fee-for-service basis, unlike HMOs, consistent with Blue Shield and Blue Cross having the lowest capitation payment rates in our data. 41 Provided we control for other di¤erences between HMO and PPO plan types this is not a problem: in fact it provides helpful variation to assist us in identifying the e¤ect of capitation on physician behavior. We note that PPOs use the same mechanism for hospital referrals as HMOs except that patients have more discretion: by paying a relatively high out-of-pocket price they can choose to visit an out-of-network hospital or physician. Pricing policies can also be di¤erent. While an HMO enrollee probably pays the same small copay whatever hospital she chooses, approximately 15% of PPO enrollees pay a coinsurance rate (a …xed percentage of the total price) that is lower if they choose an in-network hospital than if they go outside. 42 We drop hospitals to which very few patients are admitted for these two insurers, expecting thereby to remove out-of-network hospitals from the data. 43 Any remaining di¤erence in pricing strategies for PPO plans biases our estimates towards …nding no di¤erence in price coe¢ cients between high-and low-capitation insurers, since patients presumably have a higher sensitivity to price than do physicians and our model con ‡ates the price coe¢ cients of patients and physicians for Blue Cross and Blue Shield. Finally we note that the g (:) terms in the utility equation, which are permitted to vary freely across insurers in the inequalities analysis, allow Blue Shield and Blue Cross enrollees to have di¤erent preferences or greater discretion over hospital choice than those in other insurers without a¤ecting the price coe¢ cient.
We make several assumptions to de…ne hospital prices for the logit analysis that are not needed for the inequality analysis. If discount information is missing we …ll it in for the logit analysis using regression analysis. (These observations are excluded from the inequalities analysis.) For 7.5% of the hospitals in the sample we do not observe the discount for the calendar year but do observe discount data for both relevant …scal years (from the annual …nancial statements; …scal years vary 4 1 However this is not the only reason for variation in the percent capitation variable across insurers. Interviews with o¢ cials at the DMHC indicate that not all PPO plans are exclusively fee-for-service and not all HMOs in California are exclusively capitated. 4 2 The Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Health Bene…ts Survey 2003 shows that the di¤erence in pricing strategies was not large in that year. 14% of covered workers in a PPO plan paid a coinsurance rate, 26% paid a dollar copay and 59% paid neither. In contrast 5% of HMO enrollees paid a coinsurance rate and 49% paid a copay. 4 3 The inequalities analysis drops hospitals with fewer than 50 switches with other hospitals in the data. This implies dropping 8% of hospitals for Blue Shield and 5% for Blue Cross. Given that on average 83% of the hospitals in the market are included in each insurer's network (Ho (2006) ), this is likely to be su¢ cient to exclude out-of-network hospitals. across hospitals). We …ll in the missing calendar year information using the predictions from a regression of calendar year discounts on …scal year discounts and hospital characteristics (…xed e¤ects for hospital systems, service type, control type, Hospital Referral Region, teaching hospitals and particular services provided and lagged numbers of doctors and beds, all as reported in the American Hospital Association data for 2003). The R 2 of the regression is 0.61. A further 12.1% of hospitals have missing discount data for the relevant …scal years and the calendar year; in this case we use the predictions of a regression of calendar year discounts on hospital characteristics which has a R 2 of 0.49.
In addition, for the logit analysis, if the set of patients to be used to determine a patient's price in a particular hospital is empty, we expand the group of "similar" patients to include women in the same age category and with the same Charlson score and principal diagnosis. If this is also empty we expand it to include all same-age category same-principal diagnosis patients, then all same-principal diagnosis women. If this group is also empty we take the mean of the non-missing prices already calculated for the particular patient. (This is not an issue for the inequality analysis:
we only compare hospitals where prices can be calculated for both switching patients.)
Appendix 2: Estimation of the Discount Variation Across Insurers
This appendix provides details of the method discussed in Section 7.3 that was used to estimate the variation in discounts across insurers. We begin with the average negotiated discount at the hospital level, d h . 44 This is a weighted average of the discounts for both inpatient and outpatient services to both Knox Keene and Point of Service (POS) insurers. We assume for the moment that the discount at the hospital-insurer level, d ;h , does not di¤er across diagnoses for a given ( ; h) pair; we relax this assumption in the section on robustness tests. We use data from the OSHPD hospital discharge and …nancial records for 2003 that are not used in the main analysis. First, we have discharge data covering all Knox Keene inpatient events in the year 2003, including diagnoses other than labor and births. We observe a list price for every discharge. Second, the hospital …nancial reports include data on hospital h's total charges (sum of list prices) for managed care (Knox Keene and POS) inpatient services and separately for managed care outpatient services.
) is the share of Knox Keene 's inpatient (outpatient plus POS inpatient) charges in hospital h we know that: 
whereẽ h = P e ;h d ;h .
To proceed we need a speci…cation for HMO inpatient discounts at di¤erent hospitals. We begin by writing
where 8h; P d ;h = 0, so that d 0 + d h is the mean hospital discount, and P hd h = 0 so that d 0 is the mean of the (mean) hospital discount (across hospitals). Our reduced form model for the mean hospital discount is Substituting these speci…cations into equation (20) generates the following equation which can be estimated using nonlinear least squares:
where e h = P (1 + s h ) s ;h v ;h + v h +ẽ h .
The estimates, set out in Tables 1 and 2 of this Appendix, are intuitive. Table 1 sets out the results when X h;m includes both hospital characteristics and market …xed e¤ects. Model 1 includes insurer …xed e¤ects; in Model 2 we collapse these into a …xed e¤ect for high-capitation insurers (Paci…care together with Aetna, Health Net and Cigna), a …xed e¤ect for Blue Cross and a continuous variable de…ned as the insurer's share of HMO enrollment in California. 45 In both cases we …nd that for pro…t hospitals and hospitals that are members of systems (groups of providers that bargain jointly with insurers) have signi…cantly higher discounts than other hospitals. At …rst sight this is surprising since a higher discount implies a lower price paid to the hospital. However, this is likely to be explained by the substantial variation in list prices across hospitals. We show in Table 6 of Ho and Pakes (2011) that for pro…t hospitals have higher prices net of discounts than not-for-pro…t hospitals. If we add an indicator for hospitals in systems to the regression we …nd that system hospitals, too, have signi…cantly higher prices than other hospitals. 46 These results indicate that, while discounts are high for system and for pro…t hospitals, list prices are higher, so that the net price paid conditional on severity is also relatively high for these providers.
Other hospital characteristics such as indicators for teaching hospitals and hospitals that provide transplants (a measure of high-tech hospitals) are not signi…cant in our analyses. The coe¢ cient on a variable measuring the hospital's share of beds in the market, a potential measure of hospital bargaining power, is negative as expected but not signi…cant at p=0.05. The insurer …xed e¤ects in Model 1 are all statistically insigni…cant and the magnitudes demonstrate no particular correlation between insurer capitation levels and discounts. In Model 2 the coe¢ cient for high-capitation insurers is slightly negative, and that for Blue Cross is somewhat more negative compared to the 4 5 We use the share of enrollment at the state level rather than the market level to help avoid endogeneity problems due to insurers with high discounts in a particular market attracting high enrollment in that market. 4 6 The analysis controls for patient severity by using as a price measure the price ratio p ratio i
where pi is the price (list price multiplied by h ) for patient i and ps i is the average price for same-severity patients across all hospitals in the sample. The results of these regressions are excluded from this paper to conserve space. They are available from the authors on request.
excluded plan (Blue Shield) although neither coe¢ cient is signi…cant at p=0.05. The coe¢ cient on HMO market share is positive (although again insigni…cant), consistent with a bargaining power story. We use the results in Model 2 to calculate the predicted^ ;h that are used in the inequalities analysis since they provide a somewhat smoother prediction of the variation in discounts across insurers than the results in Model 1. The hypothesis that Model 2 …ts the data as well as Model 1 cannot be rejected in an F-test of size 0.05. 47 In Table 2 we replace the market …xed e¤ects with market characteristics. We view this as an exploratory exercise to check that our results are consistent with the previous literature on the impact of hospital and insurer concentration on prices. Our results are similar to those in previous papers: we …nd that variables likely to be positively correlated with hospital bargaining power are negatively related to hospital discounts, while those positively related to insurer bargaining power are positively correlated with discounts. For example, in Model 3 we …nd that when market …xed e¤ects are removed the positive coe¢ cient on the insurer market share variable and the negative coe¢ cient on hospital market share both become signi…cant at p=0.05. Models 4-5 demonstrate that discounts are signi…cantly higher in markets with more hospitals per thousand population and lower in markets with more insurers per 1000 population.
The …nal step is to use these estimates to generate a prediction for d ;h . There are two possibilities. First, since: ;h )lp o (c i ; h) and (1 e 2 ;h )lp o (c i ; h), together with estimation error from this step and measurement error from the expected list price calculation, will be inputs into the error term " i h ; ;h de…ned in Section 7.2.
While use of p 1 (:) and/or p 2 (:) as our price variable mitigates the problems that could arise from using a price variable that does not account for insurer-speci…c discounts, it probably does not eliminate them. To the extent that doctors know ;h and select hospitals based on its value there will still be a selection bias in both of these price variables 48 , and if doctors know h and select based on its value there will be an additional source of selection bias in p 1 ( ) 49 . 4 8 Only the component of (1 e ;h )lp o (ci; h) that di¤ers across ci groups within a hospital-severity pair will be absorbed into the error term rather than into g (:). However, the interaction with the list price implies that there will be some such variation and if decision-makers observe it this will cause endogeneity bias. We assume thatẽ h is unrelated to discounts and therefore not problematic here. 4 9 We did investigate the magnitude of the errors through a regression analysis. Note from equation (23) . "Cost per admission" is average hospital cost per admission in $000. "Share in CA" is insurer's share of HMO enrollment in California. pseudo-R 2 is 1 -(SSR from full model / SSR from model including only a constant). ** = signi…cant at p=0.05; *=signi…cant at p=0.10. Notes: NLLS analysis of variation in hospital discounts d h across hospitals, insurers and markets.
See notes to Table 5 for details. ** = signi…cant at p=0.05; *=signi…cant at p=0.10.
